Don't.
Just don't.
You can't talk an alcoholic into becoming sober. He has to figure it out for himself. He has to have so destroyed his life that sobriety is all he has left. It's literally tragic that you can see it coming and know there's nothing you can do about it. If from a distance you see a man walking backwards over a cliff there's nothing you can do to save him. The cliff is too far way. Your voice won't carry. You know what's coming. You can time it. But you can't do anything about it.
Trump voters are like that. Backing over a cliff, drinking themselves stupid on his mendacity: a mendacity that is impossible to expose because it has never been hidden. His lies are so numerous, so obvious, and so dangerous that, though he does everything short of starting his speeches with "by the way, don't believe a word I'm about to say, staring with my next sentence," he can't get his followers to hear him. It would be comical in a movie. In life it's frightening and sad.
They'll learn. Or they won't. There's nothing you can do. I saw a Trump ad that ended, "All she's interested in is money, and power, and herself." The main problem with the claim is that NO ONE could possibly believe that sentence applies to Hillary and not (infinitely more aptly) to Trump. But no one is laughing. He's stripping himself naked in public daily and pointing his finger at his opponent and saying, "Look at that shameless woman without any clothes."
If you talked to them, they'd ask you for facts. But they don't recognize facts. They visit Breitbart, and Fox News and all of your Right Wing bullshit sites and then ask you for facts. Keep your facts. Facts mean nothing to these people. A fact to a Trump voter is an empty glass. What's the point? You can't get drunk off that.
Monday, October 17, 2016
Sunday, September 25, 2016
Energy and Interpretation
Heat is the part of light that we see with our skin.
Light is the part of heat that we feel with our eyes.
When we feel with our eyes we call it seeing.
When we see with our skin we call it feeling.
Monday, September 19, 2016
Ontological Despair
ity. How it is is is used
so indiscriminately
of rocks and seasons and God
I cannot say. But that it is is clear
to anyone with ears.
Thursday, September 8, 2016
Blow the Trump-et.
If the success of Donald Trump to this point reveals a
fundamental weakness in the theoretical underpinnings of democracy, the actual election
of the man would reveal the sad fact that this form of government has, contrary
to the rhetoric of its advocates, nothing on those forms it opposes. It is
often said that we are a young nation. That’s true. But young as we are, we’re
old enough to know better—if this form of government is a way to train people
who know better, who make good choices, who vote according to their actual interests.
It’s also true that many who are going to vote for Trump are sensible enough not
to like him or believe him, that they would rather not “have to” vote for him. In
fact the majority are apparently not voting for the demagogue so much as voting
against his opponent, variously criticized as corrupt or greedy. But it does
not take a keen political observer to see that there’s nothing Hilary Clinton
has been suspected of that Trump has not amply shown himself guilty of—greed,
lying, skirting the law, manipulating the system, seeking wealth and personal
power against all other interests. He is the possessor of a mendacity so patent
and profound that any number of people have wondered whether his candidacy has
not been from the start a conscious joke which he himself has fallen victim to,
whether he really wants to be president, whether he’s been trying from day one
to throw the election. I myself go further and wonder if he even knows what he
wants or ever has or has ever been capable of it. His story changes from day to
day. He has such a flippant attitude toward facts that he may not be able to
tell truthfully whether he was serious or not when he descended the escalator
like a god deigning to appear before his people—like an ironic quotation of showman
Hitler descending from the skies in The
Triumph of the Will. And when it comes to undermining our democracy, it’s
clear that Trump has been doing that in small ways his whole life--by
manipulating the legal system that was set up to ensure justice and fairness,
by buying his way out of serving in the military, by manipulating tax laws or
bribing his way out of lawsuits; if he becomes president he won’t be able to
stop himself from undermining our country in a much bigger way. His very
ignorance (revealed in big or small ways almost every time he opens his mouth)—this
ignorance of the particulars of the Constitution and of the job he thinks he’s
seeking guarantee as much. Our democratic system is built on the idea that the
common person is better able to assess his/her needs than are the wealthy and
powerful elites, that “common sense” leads common people to recognize and
support their own interests. This is why ordinary people, whatever their
education, are allowed to vote. Trump’s present attainments and apparently
viable prospects call this foundational idea into question.
All hope is not, however, yet lost. Perhaps we will yet
prove that American Democracy is in some meaningful way exceptional. Although
China may now use Trump as evidence that there’s nothing special in our form of
government, the strength of the system, if it does retain strength and has any
pretentions to bragging rights on the world stage, can yet be revealed—by an
overwhelming defeat of Trumpery.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Spring and Fall to an Old Man
April stopped by with its cool sunshine
that feels warm only by contrast.
We imagined ourselvesthat feels warm only by contrast.
seeking clovers in the grass
by the pile of unburned logs.
Before we knew it
was here it wasn’t, the hyacinths, green sticks,
shriveled brown tips, wrinkled bits of color,
like wads of chewed gum,
and the daffodils' blooms
dull yellow paper
dried and drooping,
lying on rocks
like the heads of the condemned.
We should have checked the calendar
Wednesday, August 10, 2016
Why Won't They Vote for Hilary?
I’ve been watching the “I could never vote for Hilary”
people with great interest, trying to figure out the basis for this stance,
which on the surface is just plain bizarre when not voting for Hilary amounts
to a de facto voting for an unstable,
clownish, megalomaniac.
This is what I have observed: there are primarily two groups
of people who won’t vote for Hilary: the Bernie-or-Bust people and the
Nostalgic-for-Reagan people. I am not sure the same analysis can be applied equally
to both groups. The Bernie-or-Bust people are the smaller group, so I am not
primarily concerned with them.
The vast majority of the anti-Hilary people are in the other
group. But their own affection for Reagan makes it very difficult to take their
hatred of Hilary seriously. Reagan, among his many sins, sold weapons to our
enemies in order to fund an illegal war in Central America. Either of those
acts is far worse than anything Hilary has ever been accused of doing or ever
would do. (I mean of course “seriously accused,” since there are those who have
accused her of being in league with Satan.) And in fact the vast majority of
the reasons these people give for hating Hilary are demonstrably specious—essentially
made up (the whole Benghazi “scandal” for example, for which there is literally
no basis in fact).
Now I don’t want to excuse Hilary. She has done some stupid
and even perhaps reckless things—but nothing that any thoughtful observer could
use to suggest either that she is either unqualified for the presidency or, more
importantly, that she is not an infinitely better choice than the befuddled
sociopath who is her opponent, even if all the stories were true.
In other words, the hatred for Hilary, the “I could never
pull the lever beside her name” talk in fact has little if any relationship to
any honest evaluation of Hilary as a potential president. That does not mean
that those who come to this conclusion don’t believe they come to it honestly. But it does mean that in fact they do not.
So what is really behind this hatred of Hilary? Some will
say it is a conscious or unconscious bias against the fact that she is a woman.
There may be something to that, but I don’t think it accounts for much. I don’t
think that that alone explains the vitriol or resentment. In fact we see this
same vitriol in every election and on both sides. Sure, there is misogyny
against Hilary as there is racism against Obama, but in fact at this level all candidates are hated beyond any reason
by a large swath of voters who don’t vote for them.
Trump is the exception of course. He’s hated with good
reason by both sides. So perhaps to understand the hatred of Hilary it will be
useful to understand the acceptance of Trump. An acceptance of Trump has to be
to some extent pathological, since there can be no reasonable justification for
it. In fact he’s the reverse of the same impulse that produces the hatred of
Hilary.
I don’t think this pathology is limited to those who accept Trump
or hate Hilary. In fact it is pervasive (if not necessarily universal) on both
sides.
I have entertained the idea that the problem is the rhetoric
that is used to get these people elected, which is full of the trumped up
hatred of the other with exaggerated language and absurd conclusions. Until
Trump came along, this language, as most of us knew, was primarily “just
politics.” We knew enough not to take it seriously. If to win an election the
Democrat said of the Republican “He’s not qualified to be president,” we winked.
We dialed it down without thinking. So that now when we actually do have a
candidate who is not only not qualified but comically unqualified we out of
habit dial that observation down as though it were the typical political hyperbole.
The “cry wolf” syndrome. That may have something to do with how it is an
otherwise reasonable person could bring herself to vote for Trump, but it doesn’t
explain the hatred of Hilary.
I think that what does explain not just this bizarre behavior
but the bizarre language and behavior surrounding every American election is
simple ego-maintenance. The voters think they are thinking, think they are
thinking for themselves, think they are thinking their own thoughts. But
thoughts are not driving either votes for the sociopath or the refusal to vote
for the qualified candidate. Rather the voter who won’t vote for Hilary even in
this unprecedented situation are simply finding it impossible to see herself as
someone who can belong to the group of people who vote for Hilary. In her mind she
is part of a tribe, and this is a tribe of people who hate Hilary. These Hilary
haters are like sports fans. Sports fans can get violent in their preference
for their team or their hatred of the Yankees. Any thoughtful person knows that
there is no rational basis for the preference of any sports team over any
other. It’s a matter of autonomic loyalty, pure and simple. Still there are
fans of the Red Sox who would not root for the Yankees for any amount of reward.
And there are members of the American electorate who could not vote for the
obviously qualified candidate even when not voting for her is a threat to the
stability of the republic itself.
In fact that is, essentially, the American electorate.
This is a fact of what we have gotten used to calling “human
nature.” I doubt there’s any way out of it, though individuals might learn at
times to put it aside (they will be few and they’ll have to do something that
feels like tearing off a piece of their identity to do it). I do still believe
that individuals can come to recognize, at times, the irrationality of their
prejudices and can successfully fight to overcome them and grow from the act. But
it’s getting harder to maintain that optimism. And without that optimism, it
becomes very difficult to hold on to the theoretical basis for this 18th-century
formation of democracy.
Thursday, August 4, 2016
The Smell of Cigarette Smoke in an Empty Room
To promise the poet atonement is
To promise more than you know….
It is a kind of suicide
The bliss of the bleeding throat—
A kind of assassination or…
Why am I here
right nowIn this room?
I don’t even know what I came to the kitchen to get—
It wasn’t a knife or a glass of anything.
Was it the question I find unsought
between the dirty dishes and compost?
If I can’t remember what I was after, why
can I remember that there was a quest
and I was on it?
Saturday, July 30, 2016
Proper Respect
Trump voters ask me to respect their choice. I can’t. It’s
not a respectable choice. This is a democracy. I respect their right to make
that choice. If you want to vote for him, I will not lock your door or chain
you to the bed or hide your car keys. In a country where Republicans are disenfranchising
their opposition wherever they can by pushing “voter I.D. laws,” I will respect
your right to make up your mind and cast your vote. Nor would I support any
trickery that would try to prevent you. But I cannot respect your choice.
Donald Trump is a demagogue. Mike Pence criticized President
Obama for calling him this. He said that name calling has no place in our
democracy. (Someone ought to introduce Mike Pence to his running mate.) But it
is not name calling to call Donald Trump a Demagogue. “Crooked Hillary” is name
calling, “Lying Ted,” “Lazy Jeb.” These are examples of name calling. If I
called Donald Trump the bloated host of the hirsute, Day-Glo alien attached to
his scalp, that would be name calling. “Demagogue” is a descriptive term—wholly
accurate: “a political leader who seeks support by appealing to popular desires
and prejudices rather than by using rational argument.” It is a negative term
because it labels a negative thing, like “murderer” and “rapist.”
Donald Trump is a demagogue. And that’s about the nicest
thing I could say about him. To choose to vote for him is a mistake. It may be
one made out of a sincere and heart-felt desire to make America Great. But it
won’t do that. You don’t make a shirt clean or a country great by dragging it
through the mud.
Thursday, July 28, 2016
What Is the Number?
There are many ways to kill yourself.
But if they didn’t have guns, many people who would wouldn’t.
They wouldn’t try or they wouldn’t succeed. They’d get help.
The moment of panic would pass.
Many would be alive today.
Guns don’t kill people, people do. Yes.
But they do it so much more easily with guns.
So much more efficiently
So much more successfully.
Just aim at head or heart and pull.
It’s no wonder it’s the tool of choice.
You may think it protects you.
And maybe it does.
Maybe there will be a time when you personally for your own preservation will find yourself lucky
you have a gun.
It’s not likely. Chances are better it will kill you
Or it will kill your spouse or one of your children
Or one of your neighbors or friends.
This is well attested, but no one can be sure.
Keep it, if you think it’s worth the risk.
Life is a gamble.
But please
To honor those who will die
Ask yourself this:
Where is your price point?
How many souls is your comfort worth?
On the off chance that sometime in the uncertain future you will be among the very few this thing
has rescued, how many other lives equal yours?
Tuesday, July 19, 2016
Fixing the Door
For many months
if you did not open the screen door just right,
pulling up on the handle to keep the wheel that would no longer turn above the track and holding
the tension
until it was all the way open or all the way closed,
the whole thing would crash on the deck.
Every fifth time, it crashed anyway.
You’d curse.
Everyone cursed that fucking door.
Today, you took the door deliberately off its track.
You opened the package with the two metal wheels (which you’d bought months
ago),
and, drilling one hole and putting in one screw,
you fixed it.
It was as easy as you knew it would be,
which is why you took so long to do it. All day
the family has been going in and out of that door to sun,
to visit the
garden,
to cool themselves in the pool.
The door works perfectly.
No one has noticed.
Tuesday, July 5, 2016
First Contact Speech
My friends—I call you friends, though I do not know you,
though I understand that many of you wish bad things for me and my people,
though if I knew each of you as a person, some I would laugh with and share a
bowl and some I would greet through gritted teeth, I call you friends. –I
call you friends as a sign of my good will, not because we are
friends but because I hope your people and my people can live in peace. I call
you friends to make us friends. If your tongue has a better word, I do not know it.
My
friends, you say you bring me God. God is already here. You know this already. You
tell us God is everywhere. God is here. You say that this is true. You
therefore bring us knowledge of God, God who is everywhere, God who has always
been here. We thank you. We will hear your knowledge of God. And we will give
you our knowledge of God. We will exchange our knowledge with your knowledge
like fire of two colors, like a flame doubles when divided.
My friends, you say
your knowledge of God is true knowledge and our knowledge of God is not-true knowledge.
You wish to take our knowledge which is coal away from us and give us yours which is gold. It
may be our knowledge is coal and yours is gold. Gold is a useless ornament on a
cold night. It is rare, hard to find, requires much labor to become a bauble that
burns falsely in flashes. It gives light only when light is not needed, when
the sun burns. Its light has no heat, and this is good, because when it burns
no heat is needed. Coal is everywhere. It is easy to find. It gives heat to
all, requiring no skill or wealth. I am glad our knowledge is coal. Perhaps you
come from a place where there is no coal. I am glad your knowledge is gold.
When we do not freeze, when we are well fed and watered and well pleased with
our lives, we may admire this gold and ask of it what ornament it may add to
our wisdom.
We have
received already one lump of gold. And it is this: you call God God. This is
gold. We call God many names. This is coal. But God has no name. God is beyond naming. This
is an ornament to our knowledge.
Before I will receive any more of your
gold, please take from me an equal weight of coal in even exchange for this
gold.
My friends, you call God "he" and "him." Your eyes
see the world as "he" and "him" and "she" and "her." In all persons and all animals and
all plants, you see the two of your tongue and so your tongue does not permit
a one or a many that is a one or a many but for being a not-two. You must be
patient. This is hard to say in the words of your tongue. You see the outside
of things. And on this outside you see person as high and all other things as
low. We do not see this. If person is the highest of all things, then you say
God is a person, forgetting that this saying is a picture. When you see
persons, you see man and not-man and you say that man is higher. We do not see
this. You forget that this saying is a picture that says more of what you do not know
than what you do know. So you say God is a man-person. You look around and you
see the world in numbers. You say I am not my wife. You say I am not my
children. I am not my people. I am not the earth, the stars, the sky. You say
the rivers do not flow through me on their way to the sky. We do not see this.
You say God is one. You say God is one-male-person. This is not gold. This is
not coal. This is that which is not. This is a stone lifted to smash a bone then
tossed aside forever. This is a stone when it is not a stone. What I give you
is coal.
You must be patient, my friends. If your tongue has better words to say this, I do not know them. I do not believe it does. This is hard to say in your
tongue.
Sunday, July 3, 2016
Fencing as You Go
To some degree your words are defined by your use of them,
defined, that is, as you use them.
Your interlocutors have then to navigate what you say by reference to their
knowledge of the language and their intuition of the present situation. (This is not fully recognized in any research I have read on the subject, but it seems to be implicit in the work of Austin.) Wittgenstein informs us that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Yes, but that means that the words' meanings are being made every time they are used. Add to this
the imperfect presence of any speaker’s meaning to himself at the point of
the utterance and you see the inherent and practical
imprecision of every saying. And this is only the beginning of the
complications, but it is as far as I will go at the moment. The deeper we investigate
the complexities of the utterance, the worse it gets for what we like to call “communication.”
Language affords all sorts of tricks that allow us to think we’re being
rational when we are actually saying nothing at all—and to congratulate
ourselves on our cleverness.
Thursday, June 30, 2016
How to Read Anything (C.S. Lewis, Jillian Keenan and Company)
On the one hand you have comments such as this: “For there
can be no serious doubt that Milton meant just what Addison said: neither more,
nor less, nor other than that. If you can’t be interested in that, you can’t be
interested in Paradise Lost” (C. S.
Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost, 71).
On the other hand, you have comments like this: “We all have our own versions, and those interpretations are as valid as anyone’s…. Characters are like clouds: we all see different animals hidden in them” (Jillian Keenan, Sex with Shakespeare, 21).
Either there's only one correct way to read a text--or anything goes.
Lewis’ version of reading, which allows only two possibilities, the correct interpretation and error, is at odds with the history of interpretation and with language itself. All texts actually get multiple interpretations, remain sites of agony for various meanings among contentious factions and, far from settling into singleness from the concerted efforts of equally perspicacious, equally well educated readers, endlessly accrue and multiply meanings. And language itself, as shown by everyone from Saussure to Derrida, simply cannot ever be so absolutely nailed down.
But is Keenan’s view any better? Lewis would have called her informal reading method wishy washy (or something equally disparaging). It’s nonrigorous, nonserious. It puts the expert and the amateur on the same plain--a way of thinking that is currently having disastrous effects in the sciences where ignorant American politicians feel authorized to pronounce on matters they know less about than school children. It’s a complacent way of thinking, an unapologetic attempt to abuse (in Keenan's case) Shakespeare’s texts into mirrors for herself the working out of her private quirks or neuroses. It may be useful for her to do this and entertaining for us to watch her do this, in a kind of voyeuristic way, but in the end, if it tells us anything about Shakespeare it will be by chance.
On the other hand, you have comments like this: “We all have our own versions, and those interpretations are as valid as anyone’s…. Characters are like clouds: we all see different animals hidden in them” (Jillian Keenan, Sex with Shakespeare, 21).
Either there's only one correct way to read a text--or anything goes.
Lewis’ version of reading, which allows only two possibilities, the correct interpretation and error, is at odds with the history of interpretation and with language itself. All texts actually get multiple interpretations, remain sites of agony for various meanings among contentious factions and, far from settling into singleness from the concerted efforts of equally perspicacious, equally well educated readers, endlessly accrue and multiply meanings. And language itself, as shown by everyone from Saussure to Derrida, simply cannot ever be so absolutely nailed down.
But is Keenan’s view any better? Lewis would have called her informal reading method wishy washy (or something equally disparaging). It’s nonrigorous, nonserious. It puts the expert and the amateur on the same plain--a way of thinking that is currently having disastrous effects in the sciences where ignorant American politicians feel authorized to pronounce on matters they know less about than school children. It’s a complacent way of thinking, an unapologetic attempt to abuse (in Keenan's case) Shakespeare’s texts into mirrors for herself the working out of her private quirks or neuroses. It may be useful for her to do this and entertaining for us to watch her do this, in a kind of voyeuristic way, but in the end, if it tells us anything about Shakespeare it will be by chance.
Clearly, in my view, neither Lewis nor Keenan is right. He But the middle
ground one might reach is hardly less problematic. Lewis is disingenuous or naïve
when he claims that his singular view of the text covers all the intended (let
alone the unintended) implications of Paradise
Lost. He severely oversimplifies the text, cutting it off from innumerable
rich and challenging readings that can and have proven productive—from Blake to
Fish. The idea that the text to be seen properly
has to be seen only via the ways that his own vision of Christianity matches
(as he sees it) Milton’s own shows an unsupportable confidence in his own
ability to align his 20th century consciousness with that of 17th
century Milton, perhaps again a naivete, perhaps a Miltonic hubris—also ironic
in an essay that centrally valorizes differences over samenesses and condemns
the “enduring human heart,” as a valid critical focus. At the same time Keenan
allows too little resistance in the text. True, she’s actually struggling with
it. But she’s struggling against what the text seems to be in order to force it
to reflect her own needs for the text. She's clever, and worth reading. And her book will teach you something about Shakespeare and about reading. But even her metaphor reveals the problem.
While it may be true that not all people see the same shape in a cloud, it’s
not true that we all see different shapes in them. When a cloud looks like a
dog a lot
of people are going to see the dog. And if you don’t see the dog, I
can show it to you.
I don’t think either Lewis or Keenan is doing anything
wrong. What’s wrong is proclaiming that what they are doing is true or right,
that it conforms to the facts of a text. For Lewis, the only way to be
interested in Milton’s poem is to be interested in the view of Christianity
reflected in that poem—whether or not Lewis is correct in his characterization
of what the Christianity is is beside the point. For Keenan, because we are all different all
interpretations are equally valid. She’s as monolithic in her insistence on the
irretrievable openness of the text as he is in insisting on its closedness. What
in fact is Keenan herself actually doing if not inviting us to see the shape of her cloud?
Here's a better way of thinking about texts.
As I tell my own students endlessly, if you want to read a text yourself and interpret it to yourself, you can do anything you want to it or with it. You can let it work our thoughts in any direction you want them to go. You can make it your mirror or your judge. (At least you can try; there's no assurance the text will cooperate.) You can skip words you don’t know or chapters you don’t like and lose yourself in our own head without permission from the text or the literature police because there are no literature police. If you want to think “The Road Not Taken” is telling you that you should strike out on your own and always travel the less worn path, you can make the poem give you that good advice—you can use the poem to tell you what you already wanted to know. It might work. It’s a kind of masturbatory thrill. But you can masturbate to whatever turns you on. However, if you want to read a text in a community—and literature has always assumed a community of readers—then you will have to negotiate the treacherous terrain of other souls or other subjectivities. You will also have to negotiate at some point with the text itself as though it were one of those subjectivities in your reading group. Once you’ve had your fill of masturbation, you will have to cooperate with the needs and desires of your lovers.
As I tell my own students endlessly, if you want to read a text yourself and interpret it to yourself, you can do anything you want to it or with it. You can let it work our thoughts in any direction you want them to go. You can make it your mirror or your judge. (At least you can try; there's no assurance the text will cooperate.) You can skip words you don’t know or chapters you don’t like and lose yourself in our own head without permission from the text or the literature police because there are no literature police. If you want to think “The Road Not Taken” is telling you that you should strike out on your own and always travel the less worn path, you can make the poem give you that good advice—you can use the poem to tell you what you already wanted to know. It might work. It’s a kind of masturbatory thrill. But you can masturbate to whatever turns you on. However, if you want to read a text in a community—and literature has always assumed a community of readers—then you will have to negotiate the treacherous terrain of other souls or other subjectivities. You will also have to negotiate at some point with the text itself as though it were one of those subjectivities in your reading group. Once you’ve had your fill of masturbation, you will have to cooperate with the needs and desires of your lovers.
How do you do this? Since the text can only go so far in
offering to you the means to decipher it, and although all texts at all times exert the threat of pressure against your reading, more and more texts more current
than Milton or Shakespeare withdraw as much as possible from offering those
means, you have to set up for (or with) your community what counts.
In other words, you make up the rules, and then you play the game.
What are we in particular after when we read this text now? The mind of Milton may not be attainable. But it can still be the guiding principle for the reading of a text. It can be what you want to achieve and you can tirelessly seek it via whatever means you imagine would be most likely to yield it. And you can justify the quest, if you choose or if you need to or if you are recruiting more archeologists to your dig. But not on the grounds that it is the only valid thing to do with a text. Or you can utterly give up on figuring out either what the author was trying to say or what the text actually says (which again, are only ever attainable up to a point—everything gets blurry again when you focus past the optimal). But you oughtn't make this choice either in monolithic despair over the possibility of the text’s meaningful resistance to your queries or in vague (and equally monolithic) assurance that your ignorance is good as any expert's expertise.
Equally monolithic. As I was writing the previous paragraphs, I was toying with the idea that if the theory advocated by Keenan (as opposed to her actual practice) is masturbation, then Lewis’ is a form of abuse. But in fact, since all metaphors break down when pressed too hard, both methods are equally abusive in so far as they say “no” to any practice outside their own.
In other words, you make up the rules, and then you play the game.
What are we in particular after when we read this text now? The mind of Milton may not be attainable. But it can still be the guiding principle for the reading of a text. It can be what you want to achieve and you can tirelessly seek it via whatever means you imagine would be most likely to yield it. And you can justify the quest, if you choose or if you need to or if you are recruiting more archeologists to your dig. But not on the grounds that it is the only valid thing to do with a text. Or you can utterly give up on figuring out either what the author was trying to say or what the text actually says (which again, are only ever attainable up to a point—everything gets blurry again when you focus past the optimal). But you oughtn't make this choice either in monolithic despair over the possibility of the text’s meaningful resistance to your queries or in vague (and equally monolithic) assurance that your ignorance is good as any expert's expertise.
Equally monolithic. As I was writing the previous paragraphs, I was toying with the idea that if the theory advocated by Keenan (as opposed to her actual practice) is masturbation, then Lewis’ is a form of abuse. But in fact, since all metaphors break down when pressed too hard, both methods are equally abusive in so far as they say “no” to any practice outside their own.
Wednesday, June 22, 2016
The Skeleton of an Artist's Dog.
The more closely you look at grammar, the more precisely you
attempt to formulate language regularities, the more your list of “exceptions”
grows. You are forced to face the fact that no system of grammatical
regularities covers the whole system. It cannot ultimately be reduced to laws.
The grammar of the universe is written in math. And apparently the same thing
applies here: the better your math, the more closely you observe, the farther
away the total system gets. (Paradoxically the more you cover the less gets
covered, or is it just that the further you spread you tarp, the larger the
field is revealed to be?) It is the familiar problem of the particle and the
wave or of general and special relativity. Reality, to follow and perhaps
expand the metaphor of Schrodinger’s Cat, does seem to exist not only when but
also only as you look at it. (It’s not just neither alive nor dead it’s not
even a cat until you open the box.) A word gets its meaning from its use, from
the context of other words, at the moment when meaning is inscribed or
extracted. Between times there is no meaning. There aren’t even any words.
Think of sticks, which are just sticks (sticks that are just sticks do not
exist, but you can still think about them) until they are contextualized in
some way, as indicators of arboreal infection or the skeleton of an artist’s dog.
Monday, June 13, 2016
Staring Down Reality
When you look too closely at anything, it disappears. This fundamental fact, this fact as fundamental as any fact can get, gets too little attention when we attempt to show or explain or represent. You can explain quite well to any third grader what a syllable is. You can get her to demonstrate that she has understood your explanation and to go off merrily clapping her hands whenever the occasion to count syllables arises and never to question her skill or the accuracy of her knowledge or the ontological status of the thing she knows for the rest of her life. Try however to explain to a professor linguistics what a syllable is and she will poke legitimate holes in every definition you try until finally you and she will be compelled to conclude either that there is no such thing as a syllable or that there well may well be such a thing as a syllable but what they are is beyond human comprehension.
If we have this problem with something a simple as a syllable, we will almost certainly have it with anything more complex. And everything is more complex.
Compare this
What is a syllable
to this
What even is a syllable
If we have this problem with something a simple as a syllable, we will almost certainly have it with anything more complex. And everything is more complex.
Compare this
What is a syllable
to this
What even is a syllable
Sunday, May 1, 2016
Complementarianism--on the work of Frank Wilczek
When Frank Wilczek (author of A Beautiful Question, Finding Nature's Deep Design) spoke to Krista Tippet he made the
perfectly reasonable claim that beauty does not exist “out there,” that it is
merely a human perception. He also said, half joking, that when asked his
religion he replies, “I am a complementarian”—that he accepts the principle
that complementary explanations of phenomena, of being, of the universe may be
equally valid though they cannot be deployed simultaneously without mutual
contraction, such as the observation that light is both a particle and a wave
but must be considered either one or the other for a particular analysis, never
both.
So although his claim that beauty is a human perception is
perfectly reasonable, it fails to pass muster with his complementarian faith.
Beauty may be a human perception and also be out there—in fact, in some sense
has to be out there to be perceived. It has to exist neither in itself apart
from perception nor wholly as a product of perception. The analogy would be
color (so, in a sense, again, light—let there be light). If there were no eyes
there would be no color. It would not be true to say color would exist but no
one would see it; there would be no color. There would be energy (there would
not be light as such). There would be particles and waves and those waves would
have lengths even if they could not be measured. But there would be no light
and ergo no color. Light becomes light only after it is defined by the eye.
Beauty too, though less clearly boundable than something
whose properties include the measurable property of a wave, exists both because
it is defined by human experience and also as something to be defined by it.
The claims of Wilczek won’t make sense—the claim for instance that “I knew it [a
mathematical equation] was true because it was beautiful”—unless the perception
of beauty is an actual perception of something. That we feel it as beauty is
beside the point just as the fact that we experience a light energy of a
certain wavelength as red is beside the point. In its being it is not red. It
is red only in the eye. And in its being it may not be beauty—cannot be beauty—but
what we experience as beauty does exist, and it does exist as something other
than ugliness or messiness.
But what does that fact open up? It certainly opens
something.
Friday, April 22, 2016
The Ever-Changing Past
It is often said that you can’t change the past. But there’s
no important sense in which that statement is true. It is much truer to say you
can’t stop the past from changing, not for a moment. The past is in constant
flux. It is only just barely less secure than the future.
What is
the past? From the point of view of the present, which is the only point of
view we can know at all—and we know it very badly even as we experience it—it doesn’t
exist. It doesn’t exist except as part of the present. In the present it exists
as signs, as traces, as memories, all of which are at least as fallible as any
first-hand witness. We don’t really know what’s happening to us as it’s
happening. And don’t know what has happened better for having gotten some
perspective on it. (In the history of literature both perspectives are
privileged over and over, from Shakespeare’s “true avouch of my own eyes,” to Elizabeth
Barrett Browning’s, "Every age,/ Through being beheld too close, is ill discerned/ By those who have not lived past it.") The
traces may be visible like skid marks on the road, or they may be invisible
like the untraceable pain you feel at the sight of a tearful child.
The
point is that even if we were there we’d have gotten it wrong, and pulling back
and putting it into its broader context we still get it wrong. Because there is
no right. Because neither history nor any “event” in history ever existed as
such. History never existed as something that can be encompassed by language
and represented in its fullness. It never had a fullness. It was never
something you could know.
And all
the scared extremists cry, “so anything goes, huh? Your version of history is
as good as mine, and there’s no one to mediate among them?”
But
that’s obviously not true either. Some versions of history, like some versions
of scientifically verifiable facts, are better than others. Science is not the
model for history; it’s no more than one part of the far more complex paradigm
by which good history is constructed. As a heliocentric universe is better than
a geocentric universe—though neither is right—so some versions of history are
better than others. And competing versions may be equally good. The point remains
that none are right, none could be made right even under ideal circumstances,
even if everyone had recorded every motivation and we had all the documents,
and even if we could rule out unconscious, instinctive, or otherwise unknowable
causes for historical events. (The very concept “event” is already wide of the
mark.)
The
past is open and constantly in flux. In response to this fact, we need to hold
our understanding as lightly as we must hold our memories, no matter how clear
they seem. We need to take seriously other people’s stories. It is in stories
and only in stories that the present traces of history are arranged into the
meaningful patterns we call knowing. Every story is made up. Made up stories (a
redundancy therefore) are the material out of which the present is constructed
and that construction is maintained.
Thursday, April 7, 2016
Your Anger
It can never do you any good.
But you may be willing to accept its harm as long as it does greater harm to the one at whom it is directed, as you may be willing to accept the wounds of a sword provided that by your sword you kill you enemy.
But it is only anger. It's not a sword.
It does you no good and your enemy no harm--let it go.
But you may be willing to accept its harm as long as it does greater harm to the one at whom it is directed, as you may be willing to accept the wounds of a sword provided that by your sword you kill you enemy.
But it is only anger. It's not a sword.
It does you no good and your enemy no harm--let it go.
Tuesday, March 15, 2016
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